This paper studies the problem of secure communication over the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with one-sided receiver side information and with a passive eavesdropper. We proposed a coding scheme which is based upon the superposition-Marton framework. Secrecy techniques such as the one-time pad, Carleial-Hellman secrecy coding and Wyner secrecy coding are applied to ensure individual secrecy. This scheme is shown to be capacity achieving for some cases of the degraded broadcast channel. We also notice that one-sided receiver side information provides the advantage of rate region improvement, in particular when it is available at the weaker legitimate receiver.
I. INTRODUCTION A. Background
Broadcast channels model typical downlinks in communication systems, where a transmitter broadcasts independent messages to multiple receivers. Similar to other wireless communication channels, the open nature of broadcast channels make them susceptible to passive eavesdroppers present in the communication range. Due to the widespread application of broadcast channels in communication systems, it is crucial to ensure secure communication over broadcast channels.
The problem of secure broadcast channel has been studied by Csiszár and Körner [1] , Chia and El Gamal [2] as well as Schaefer and Boche [3] . These works [1] - [3] studied cases of two-or three-receiver broadcast channel in which a common message is transmitted to all receivers and a private message is protected from a certain number of receivers. Similarly, Chen, Koyluoglu and Sezgin investigated the problem of secure tworeceiver broadcast channel but it involves the protection of two private messages from an eavesdropper [4] .
The works discussed above were also extended to account for the availability of complementary receiver side information at the legitimate receivers which is unknown to the eavesdropper. The availability of complementary receiver side information implies that each receiver knows a priori the message they need not decode and it is shown to help in improving the secrecy rate region [5] - [7] .
However, when the available receiver side information is non-complementary, i.e., receiver side information is missing on certain number of receivers, it is generally unknown if the advantage of secrecy rate region improvement still holds. This motivates us to study the effect of non-complementary receiver side information on secure broadcast channel by considering the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with one-sided receiver side information and with an eavesdropper. We will also be considering the individual secrecy notion which requires the individual information leakage from each message to the eavesdropper to be vanishing [4] , [6] - [8] . In short, this paper aims to gain insights on the advantages of non-complementary receiver side information on secure broadcasting by proposing a secrecy scheme and deriving the individual secrecy rate region for the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with one-sided receiver side information and with a passive eavesdropper.
B. Contributions
Existing works on secure broadcast channel consider only symmetrical receiver side information setup, i.e., receiver side information is either absent [1]- [4] or present at both receivers [5] - [7] , [9] . The usage of the coding schemes in these works for the non-complementary receiver side information setting in this paper poses some limitations. More precisely, schemes for the former case are suboptimal since they ignore the availabity of receiver side information, whereas schemes for the latter case cannot be applied if receiver side information is absent at at least one receiver. As a result, we propose a technique to deal with this asymmetrical receiver side information setting. Using the proposed coding scheme, we derive a general inner bound for the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with one-sided receiver side information and with a passive eavesdropper under individual secrecy constraints. We show that this inner bound establishes the individual secrecy capacity region for the physically degraded deterministic broadcast channel under all permutations of channel degradedness. Through the capacity region results, we observe that the advantage of one-sided receiver side information manifests itself when it is available at the statistically weaker receiver, providing gains in the capacity rate region.
Note that due to space limitations, we have omitted some proofs in this paper and refer the reader to the extended version of this paper [10] .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we will denote random variables by uppercase letters, their corresponding realizations by lowercase letters and their corresponding sets by calligraphic letters. A (j − i + 1)-sequence of random variables will be denoted by X j i = (X i , . . . , X j ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ j. Whenever i = 1, the subscript will Fig. 1 . The two-receiver broadcast channel with one-sided receiver side information in the presence of an eavesdropper.
be dropped, resulting in X j = (X 1 , . . . , X j ). R d represents the d-dimensional real Euclidean space and R d + represents the d-dimensional non-negative real Euclidean space. R will be used to represent a subset of R d . T n represents the set of jointly -typical n-sequences. Meanwhile, [a : b] refers to a set of natural numbers between and including a and b, for a ≤ b. Lastly, the operator × denotes the Cartesian product.
The paper focuses on devising a coding scheme for the tworeceiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with one-sided receiver side information and with a passive eavesdropper (hereafter referred as the broadcast channel with one-sided receiver side information). The system model for this case is illustrated in Fig. 1 . In this model, we define (M 1 , M 2 ) as the source messages, M i as the message requested by legitimate receiver i, for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Let X denote the channel input from the sender, while Y i and Z denote the channel output to receiver i and the eavesdropper respectively. In n channel uses, X n represents the transmitted codeword, Y n i represents the signal received by legitimate receiver i and Z n represents the signal received by the eavesdropper. The memoryless (and without feedback) nature of the channel also implies that p(y n 1 , y n 2 , z n |x n ) = n i=1 p(y 1i , y 2i , z i |x i ).
In this case, the transmitter will be sending messages M 1 and M 2 to legitimate receiver 1 and 2, respectively through the channel p(y 1 , y 2 , z|x). Besides, only one of the legitimate receivers will be having the message they do not need to decode as receiver side information to aid them in decoding the transmitted messages. For our discussion, we will work with the case in which receiver 1 knows M 2 a priori.
Definition 1: A (2 nR1 , 2 nR2 , n) secrecy code for the tworeceiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with one-sided receiver side information consists of:
2 ) at receiver 2. Both messages, M 1 and M 2 are assumed to be uniformly distributed over their respective message set. Hence, we have
Meanwhile the individual information leakage rate associated with the (2 nR1 , 2 nR2 , n) secrecy code is defined as R (n)
The probability of error for the secrecy code at each receiver i is defined as P (n)
is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of (2 nR1 , 2 nR2 , n) codes such that
lim n→∞ n = 0 and lim n→∞ τ n = 0 (4)
III. CODING SCHEME FOR BROADCAST CHANNEL WITH ONE-SIDED RECEIVER SIDE INFORMATION
Our coding scheme is constructed by having the superposition-Marton coding scheme [11] , [12] as a basic framework. The message segments encoded at each layer of the scheme is then protected using secrecy techniques such as the one-time pad [13] , Carleial-Hellman secrecy coding [14] and Wyner serecy coding [15] .
As illustrated in Fig. 2a , this coding scheme involves splitting
Exploiting the availability of receiver side information at receiver 1, we will be XOR-ing the first segment of each message to form a one-time pad signal which ensures individual secrecy. The one-time pad signal M a has a rate of R a and M a = M 1a ⊕ M 2a where M a ∈ [1 : 2 nRa ]. This XOR-ing process gives us another rate relation R a = R 1a = R 2a . Note that since receiver 2 does not have any receiver side information, it is unable to retrieve M 2a even though M a is successfully decoded. As a result, we introduce a new approach of further splitting M 2a into M 2a1 at rate R 2a1 and M 2a2 at rate
will be transmitted to receiver 2 through different codeword layers, allowing M 2a to be fully recovered.
These message segments then make up the coding scheme in Fig. 2b which comprises of four layers: cloud center codeword U n , common satellite codeword V n as well as private satellite codewords V n 1 and V n 2 . The cloud center codeword U n holds the one-time pad signal M 1a ⊕ M 2a , i.e., M a . Upon decoding the one-time pad signal, receiver 1 can unveil the intended message segment M 1a using its receiver side information M 2 .
Next, a common satellite codeword V n is formed and combined with U n using superposition coding [11] . In the V n codeword layer, Carleial-Hellman secrecy coding [14] and Wyner serecy coding [15] is implemented simultaneously to protect the message segments M 1b , M 2b and M 2a1 . The implementation of Wyner serecy coding is apparent since a randomly generated D is used to protect M 1b , M 2b and M 2a1 . Carleial-Hellman secrecy coding is applied since it allows each of the message segments M 1b and M 2b to act as additional randomness in protecting each another and M 2a1 . This helps reduce the size of randomness D and subsequently increases the size of M 1b and M 2b which bear useful information.
The private satellite codewords V n 1 and V n 2 are responsible of carrying the remaining message segments to their respective legitimate receivers. In our case, V n 1 carries M 1c to receiver 1, whereas V n 2 carries M 2a2 and M 2c to receiver 2. Both V n 1 and V n 2 are also secured with Wyner secrecy coding [15] using randomly generated D 1 and D 2 respectively. The private satellite codewords V n 1 and V n 2 are first combined under Marton coding in which the components L 1 and L 2 are present to ensure the existence of at least one jointly typical sequence pair between V n 1 and V n 2 [12] . Note that L 1 and L 2 do not play a role in message protection since they cannot be preselected [16] . The V n 1 and V n 2 codeword layers are then combined with the upper U n and V n codeword layers using superposition coding, completing the construction of our coding scheme. This coding scheme achieves the individual secrecy rate region R in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: The following individual secrecy rate region is achievable for the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with one-sided receiver side information and with a passive eavesdropper:
Proof of Theorem 1: See the extended version of this paper [10, Appendix A].
IV. CAPACITY REGION IN SOME SPECIAL CASES
In this section, we will show that our scheme is optimal in achieving the individual secrecy capacity region for some special cases of the physically degraded discrete memoryless broadcast channel defined as p(y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y k |x) = p(y 1 |x)p(y 2 |y 1 ) · · · p(y k |y k−1 ), i.e., X → Y 1 → Y 2 → . . . → Y k forms a Markov chain.
More specifically, the individual secrecy capacity region for the physically degraded deterministic broadcast channel under all permutations of channel degradedness among Y 1 , Y 2 and Z is proven in the following theorems. In Theorem 2, the receiver with receiver side information is the weaker one, whereas in Theorem 3, the receiver with receiver side information is the stronger one.
Theorem 2: For the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with one-sided receiver side information and with a passive eavesdropper such that 1) Y 1 , Y 2 and Z are deterministic functions of X;
, the individual secrecy capacity region is given by
Proof of Theorem 2: We present the achievability proof in the following, and the converse proof in the extended version of this paper [10, Appendix B]. The region R 1 can be achieved by taking the union of the regions: R 1a , R 1b , R 1c and R 1d stated below. 1) For all p(x) such that H(
The individual secrecy rate region in this case can be achieved using Theorem 1 by setting U = φ, V 1 = V = Y 1 and V 2 = Y 2 . This reduces the proposed scheme to a twolayer superposition coding scheme in which V n and V n 2 need to be decoded. As a result, from the proposed coding scheme in Fig. 2b, we 
Upon removing the corresponding rate terms and constraints, we apply the Fourier-Motzkin procedure to obtain the region R 1a as follows:
2) For all p(x) such that H(
In order to achieve the individual secrecy rate region in this case, from Theorem 1, we set U = φ and
This reduces the proposed scheme to a single V n codeword layer. Thus, from the proposed coding scheme in Fig. 2b , we are left with M 1b , M 2b and D. Upon removing the corresponding rate terms and constraints, we apply the Fourier-Motzkin procedure to obtain the region R 1b as follows:
3) For all p(x) such that H(
When the eavesdropper is of equal channel strength as the weaker legitimate receiver 1, from Theorem 1, we need to set
This reduces the proposed scheme to a two-layer superposition coding scheme with the U n and V n 2 codewords. Thus, from the proposed coding scheme in Fig. 2b , we remove M 1b , M 2a1 , M 2b , M 1c , D, D 1 , L 1 and L 2 . Upon removing the corresponding rate terms and constraints, we apply the Fourier-Motzkin procedure to obtain the region R 1c as follows:
4) For all p(x) such that
When the eavesdropper is not weaker than both legitimate receivers, from Theorem 1, we need to set V 1 = V 2 = V = U = φ. This essentially means that secure communication is not possible and we obtain the region R 1d = {(0, 0)}. By taking the union of R 1a , R 1b , R 1c and R 1d , we achieve the individual secrecy capacity region (6) .
Remark 1: Referring to the individual secrecy capacity region for the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel without receiver side information and with a passive eavesdropper [4, Theorem 3], we flip the order of channel degradedness between Y 1 and Y 2 , and set Y 1 to be a deterministic function of X. Comparing that with our results in Theorem 2 shows that the availability of receiver side information at receiver 1, in particular, the weaker legitimate receiver, allows us to achieve a larger individual secrecy rate region.
Remark 2: It is also interesting to note that while using the superposition-Marton coding scheme [11] , [12] , the inclusion of one-time pad signal, a network coding solution, can help establish a secure communication when the eavesdropper is stronger than the weaker legitimate receiver. This can be observed from the achievability proof of R 1c . However, when the eavesdropper is not weaker than both legitimate receivers, secure communication is not possible.
Theorem 3: For the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with one-sided receiver side information and with a passive eavesdropper such that 1) Y 1 , Y 2 and Z are deterministic functions of X; and
Proof of Theorem 3: We present the achievability proof in the following, and the converse proof in the extended version of this paper [10, Appendix C]. The region R 2 can be achieved by taking the union of the regions: R 2a , R 2b , R 2c and R 2d stated below. 1) For all p(x) such that H(
The individual secrecy rate region in this case can be achieved using Theorem 1 by setting
As a result, we have a superposition coding scheme with only the V n and V n 1 codeword layers. From the proposed coding scheme in Fig. 2b, we 
Upon removing the corresponding rate terms and constraints, we apply the Fourier-Motzkin procedure to obtain the region R 2a as follows:
2) For all p(x) such that H(Y 1 ) = H(Y 2 ) > H(Z) In order to achieve the individual secrecy rate region in this case, from Theorem 1, we set U = φ and
The proposed scheme reduces to the V n codeword layer. Thus, from the proposed coding scheme in Fig. 2b , we are left with M 1b , M 2b and D. Upon removing the corresponding rate terms and constraints, we apply the Fourier-Motzkin procedure to obtain the region R 2b as follows:
For the case in which the eavesdropper is of equal channel strength as the weaker legitimate receiver 2, from Theorem 1, we set V 1 = Y 1 and V 2 = V = U = φ. We are essentially disregarding the weaker legitimate receiver 2 and the proposed scheme reduces to the simple wiretap channel coding scheme with only V n 1 . Thus, the proposed coding scheme in Fig. 2b is reduced to only having M 1c and D 1 . Upon removing the corresponding rate terms and constraints, we apply the Fourier-Motzkin procedure to obtain the region R 2c as follows:
When the eavesdropper is not weaker than both legitimate receivers, from Theorem 1, we need to set V 1 = V 2 = V = U = φ. This again indicates that secure communication is not possible and we obtain the region R 1d = {(0, 0)}.
By taking the union of R 2a ,R 2b , R 2c and R 2d , we achieve the individual secrecy capacity region of the channel in interest.
Remark 3:
Revisiting the individual secrecy capacity region for the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel without receiver side information and with a passive eavesdropper under similar channel degradedness [4, Theorem 3], we set Y 1 to be a deterministic function of X. From here, we realize that single-sided receiver side information is not useful in physically degraded deterministic broadcast channel when it is available at receiver 1, which is now the stronger legitimate receiver. The availability of receiver side information does not help in improving the individual secrecy rate region. As a result, when single-sided receiver side information is available at the stronger legitimate receiver, our proposed coding scheme in Fig. 2b can also be simplified by removing the U n codeword, consequently removing M a , M 1a , M 2a , M 2a1 and M 2a2 .
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we studied the case of the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with one-sided receiver side information and with a passive eavesdropper. Under the context of individual secrecy, we presented a coding scheme constructed from a combination of superposition-Marton coding scheme [11] , [12] and secrecy techniques such as the one-time pad [13] , Carleial-Hellman secrecy coding [14] as well as Wyner serecy coding [15] . This scheme is shown to be capacity achieving for some special cases of the physically degraded deterministic broadcast channel. In these cases, we observe that the availability of one-sided receiver side information at the weaker legitimate receiver provides rate region improvements. However, when one-sided receiver side information is available at the stronger legitimate receiver, no gains are obtained since their statistical strength allows full recovery of the intended message. Finally, we note that the implementation of joint secrecy and the derivation of the converse for the broadcast channel with one-sided receiver side information will be covered in future works.
